'Genes' by Prohaska, Sonja J. & Stadler, Peter F.
Preprint manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
“Genes”
Sonja J. Prohaska · Peter F. Stadler
February 11, 2008
Abstract In order to describe a cell at molecular level, a
notion of a “gene” is neither necessary nor helpful. It is suf-
ficient to consider the molecules (i.e. chromosomes, tran-
scripts, proteins) and their interactions to describe cellular
processes. The downside of the resulting high resolution is
that it becomes very tedious to address features on the or-
ganismal and phenotypic levels with a language based on
molecular terms. Looking for the missing link between bio-
logical disciplines dealing with different levels of biological
organization, we suggest to return to the original intent be-
hind the term “gene”. To this end, we propose to investigate
whether a useful notion of “gene” can be constructed based
on an underlying notion of function, and whether this can
serve as the necessary link and embed the various distinct
gene concepts of biological (sub)disciplines in a coherent
theoretical framework.
In reply to the Genon Theory recently put forward by Klaus
Scherrer and Ju¨rgen Jost in this journal, we shall discuss a
general approach to assess a gene definition that should then
be tested for its expressiveness and potential cross-discipli-
nary relevance.
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1 Introduction
In a recent issue of this journal, Klaus Scherrer and Ju¨rgen
Jost (Scherrer and Jost, 2007b) introduced an essentially com-
putational account of gene expression which introduces a
formal separation of the “gene” from the program that is re-
quired to orchestrate its expression.
The Genon Theory presents a fresh and stimulating con-
tribution to a discussion of the “gene concept” that has re-
emerged in recent years in response to evidence of greater
genomic complexity than previous concepts of the gene are
able to accommodate. It has become increasingly obvious
that the classical molecular concept of a gene as a contigu-
ous stretch of DNA encoding a functional product is incon-
sistent with the complexity and diversity of genomic orga-
nization (The ENCODE Project Consortium, 2007; Maeda
et al., 2006; Carninci, 2006; Willingham and Gingeras, 2006).
Many of the proposals from the “high-throughput commu-
nity” lean towards a purely structural point of view, focusing
on genes as structural units, often explicitly related to pro-
teins as the link to a functional interpretation (Snyder and
Gerstein, 2003; Gerstein et al., 2007). Dissenting opinions,
on the other hand, question the usefulness of “genes” in ge-
nomic context (Gerstein et al., 2007).
The Genon Theory attempts to reconcile these views by
advocating a functional, rather than structural, definition of
the gene. While this is a welcome departure from the overly
simplistic view of “genes as protein-coding DNA”, it re-
mains oriented toward the simple representation of the “gene”
as a contiguous stretch of code. It deliberately excludes the
complex collection of regulatory signals from the notion of
the “gene” and instead interprets them as a program of gene
expression, the “genon”. It is grounded in a number of fun-
damental assumptions, some implicit and some explicit. Our
discussion will start with these assumptions, which in sev-
eral case are not satisfying. Instead of presenting a particu-
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lar fixed definition of what a gene “is”, we will explore here
how a functional gene definition can be constructed depend-
ing on how the concept of “function” is formalized.
2 Gene Expression as Computation
The dichotomy of gene (data) and genon (program) is a fun-
damental assumption regarding the nature of biological in-
formation processing that is logically suspicious. In Com-
puter Science, many of the familiar programming languages,
including C, BASIC, or FORTRAN, make a clear syntactic
distinction between data and program; functional program-
ming languages such as LISP and Haskell, on the other hand,
have no means at all for making this distinction. Since her-
itable biological information necessarily must encode both
data and program, it is by no means clear that biological in-
formation processing is more like FORTRAN than LISP.
As an alternative to the separation into genes and genons,
a separation into genetic material (data) and the machin-
ery (program) that orchestrates its expression could be in-
troduced. The latter respects an important intuitive property
of data, namely the simple transfer and substitution of (parts
of) the data. Similar to the platform-independence of data —
in contrast to often platform-dependent programs — nucleic
acids can be interpreted in a wide range of contexts. Biotech-
nology, and cloning techniques in general (Sambrook and
Russel, 2001), take advantage of this property whenever a
piece of genetic material is cloned into a vector and trans-
ferred to a different organism. There a different machinery
evaluates the same sequence information and generates a
product that is similar enough to the original context to be
of practical use.
Notwithstanding the appealing intuition behind this dis-
tinction, RNA components of the machinery inherited by an
RNA molecule (as in the case of RNA viruses) pose a prob-
lem to this separation, because the same molecule would be
both data and program at the same time. Therefore, it re-
mains to be shown that an unambiguous partitioning of the
molecular components into data and program is possible and
that it results in a reasonable representation of biological re-
ality.
A central idea of Genon Theory is that one can speak
of a program that governs the expression of a gene. This
program is described as the union of the cis-genon, which
is encoded by the same molecule(s) that carry the informa-
tion of the gene, and the trans-genon. The latter is viewed
as the collection of all “trans-acting” factors that influence
gene expression. The implicit assumption here is that the ex-
pression of the gene of interest does not change its environ-
ment in an appreciable manner, e.g., by using up some of the
trans-factors or by feeding back on the expression of these
factors. Only in this limiting case does it make sense to view
the environment as a static part of the expression program,
i.e., to associate the trans-genon with the gene of interest,
instead of interpreting the environment, including the rele-
vant trans-acting factors, as the result of other programs that
concurrently express their genes. This static view of a set of
“trans-acting” factors also fails to account for the fact that
the expression of these factors is a dynamic process and will
typically not be in sync with the processing steps of the gene
of interest. We argue that specifying the collection of trans-
acting factors is insufficient to determine the “external” part
of the program of gene expression because the temporal or-
der in which they are produced and interact is crucial.
Scherrer & Jost pre-suppose several properties of the
process of gene expression. It is assumed to be determinis-
tic (at least under given environmental conditions), Marko-
vian (in the sense that each processing step only requires
the result of the previous step as input), and to proceed in
a linear sequence of a few well-separated steps. Each of
these assumptions is an idealization. The last two proper-
ties together are necessary to justify the “Cascade of Regu-
lation” and to make the notions of pre-genon, proto-genon,
etc. well-defined. As the authors themselves note in (Scher-
rer and Jost, 2007a), this assumption is often violated. Re-
cent evidence for a strong coupling for transcription, splic-
ing, and export in higher eukaryotes (Listerman et al., 2006;
Swinburne et al., 2006; Maciag et al., 2006), and the con-
currency of transcription and translation in bacterial cells
(Gowrishankar and Harinarayanan, 2004; El-Sharoud and
Graumann, 2007) implies that some of the processing stages
may never exist as discrete molecules. This blurs the bound-
aries between the individual steps.
The separation of processing steps is, however, required
to strictly distinguish cis- and trans- parts of the genon. When-
ever a processing step results in joining two fragments (e.g.
in trans-splicing), the element in trans becomes a cis-element
after completing the step. The Markov property is also vio-
lated by splicing and some export mechanisms that specif-
ically attach proteins that remain bound to the RNA during
the next maturation step(s). Again it becomes impossible to
strictly discriminate between cis- and trans-action. Exon-
junction complexes and export co-factors such as the RNA
binding protein HuR are of course not encoded in the final
mRNA, but regulation of the mRNA depends on their pres-
ence and location in the pre-mRNA. This “annotation” is not
seen in the final mRNA molecule, but is determined by the
molecule’s particular processing history.
The Genon Theory describes gene expression as a sim-
ple sequential program, thereby ignoring the network struc-
ture of gene regulation. In our view, however, the network
architecture is the very essence of biological regulation. Within
a framework that interprets gene expression as a computa-
tional process, we suggest reformulation of the trans-genon
as communication with other gene expression processes. This
















































































Fig. 1 Cascade of Regulation: At each step, information content is not
only reduced but might also increase due to integration of informa-
tion provided by the surrounding. Global environmental factors (e.g.
gravity, latitude, temperature, tide etc.) as well as local environmental
factors including localization, timing and interaction of products pro-
vide information to all steps of the cascade and establish a network
of communication. The influence of certain factors can be expected to
show great variation among organisms. Localization is suggested to
play an important role for many steps. The more environmental factors
can be taken for granted, the less information needs to be encoded and
transmitted from step to step.
sion as a Distributed Computing System (Attiya and Welsh,
2004). To this end, we must give up the idea that there is
a single, independent program governing the expression of
each individual gene (one mRNA/gene – one genon hypoth-
esis). Instead, we need to model a collection of computa-
tional processes — one for each sequence of consecutive
processing steps — that communicate via their trans-actions.
Formal models of this type have recently been introduced
in systems biology (Danos and Laneve, 2004; Danos et al.,
2007; Kuttler and Niehren, 2006) using pi-calculus and re-
lated formalisms.
3 Genes sensu Jost & Scherrer
The Genon Theory emphasizes a functional point of view
and attempts to define the gene as a “basis of a unit func-
tion”. It deliberately “give[s] up the correspondence of the
gene as functional unit and as a DNA locus.” While there
are rules to map genes back to the genome, these rules are
not considered a defining property of the gene. Heritability,
on the other hand, is. Jost and Scherrer, though, seem to view
heritability as irrelevant, arguing that modern molecular bi-
ology is essentially about function.
We strongly disagree with this view. The concept of the
“Gene” is common ground to most disciplines of biology
and historically has been instrumental in the synthesis of
subdisciplines, e.g. evolution and development. We there-
fore argue that a meaningful notion of “Gene” cannot be
constructed with only a particular sub-discipline in mind.
Heritability is a crucial property since it is the purpose of
genomes to transmit the encoded instructions for generating
functional units, instead of transmitting the functional units
themselves. Even within the scope of modern molecular bi-
ology, the concept of heritable genes is indispensable: we
need to be able to speak of homology — most commonly de-
fined as descent from a common ancestor — among genes.
Common ancestry of functional units is the main justifica-
tion for translational approaches that attempt to utilize infor-
mation obtained for model organisms such as mouse or fruit-
fly to understand similar biological processes in humans.
Furthermore, it appears that genes are necessary to under-
stand the selection part of the evolutionary process: In order
to describe what selection does on a molecular level, only
nucleotide sequences are required; to conceptualize the why,
however, a functionally defined gene is at least very useful.
Scherrer & Jost proceed to equate function with “func-
tional products” derived from the genetic encoding: “A cel-
lular function can be represented by a polypeptide or an
RNA”, “Genetic function is carried out by proteins com-
posed of folded polypeptides”. Despite a section on RNA
genes, the text leaves no doubt that protein-coding genes are
considered the paradigm of genetic information processing;
indeed, the Genon Theory fails to provide concepts to incor-
porate non-protein-coding “genes” in general. A more im-
plicit assumption of the Genon Theory is the idea that pro-
tein coding mRNAs are the most interesting and most impor-
tant type of products that are produced from DNA. In light
of the results of the ENCODE and FANTOM projects we
reject this “proteinocentric” point of view. Protein-coding
sequence covers less than 2% of the genome, while approx-
imately 10% is under stabilizing selection. This is at least
indicative of some biological function. As almost all of this
sequence is transcribed we have to assume that much of it
exerts its function as some processing product of the pri-
mary transcript, which is often not associated with any pro-
tein (Pheasant and Mattick, 2007). From this point of view,
nothing about the mature mRNA stage is so special as to
warrant the definition of this stage, along with the regula-
tion of translation, as the focal point of biological informa-
tion processing.
From these assumptions, Scherrer and Jost deduce that
there is a single stage in the life of a transcript that lends
itself to a natural definition of the gene, namely the last
processing product before translation: “[The gene] finally
emerges as an uninterrupted nucleic acid sequence at mRNA
level, just prior to translation, in faithful correspondence
with the amino acid sequence to be produced as a polypep-
tide”. The gene concept thus coincides with the well-estab-
lished notion of “Open Reading Frame”. Consequently, there
are many more (protein-coding) genes than protein coding
loci (the authors estimate 500 000 vs. 25 000), since any two
mRNAs giving rise to distinct polypeptides (e.g. via alter-
native splicing) are counted as distinct genes. On the other
hand, the expression of the same function (i.e., the same
functional molecule) at different times or in different cells
counts as a single gene.
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It is overly restrictive, however, to identify cellular func-
tions with directly encoded gene products. Several classes
of important molecules, all of which are “functional” (at
least to most researchers), including steroid hormones, co-
enzymes, pigments, polysaccharides, etc., are not directly
encoded, but are quite indirectly the consequence of genetic
encoding. Conversely, the polypeptide that is obtained di-
rectly by decoding the mRNA is in many cases not func-
tional at all. It may need the assistance of chaperons to fold
into its active tertiary structure, it may need to be modi-
fied, e.g. by glycosylation or other chemical modification,
or it may be cleaved or fused with other (possibly modified)
peptide chains. More importantly, there are crucial regula-
tory functions in which a process, e.g. the act of transcrip-
tion to modify the chromatin state (Shearwin et al., 2005;
Mazo et al., 2007), or the act of initial translation to remove
the exon-junction complexes (Isken and Maquat, 2007), is
crucial, while the associated products created by these pro-
cesses (a primary transcript and a polypeptide, respectively)
are completely irrelevant for all we know.
On the other hand, function need not be associated with
the generation of a product at all, as is the case with cis-
acting regulatory elements. A classical example is the lac
operator lacO (Jacob and Monod, 1961). Besides cis domi-
nance, this sequence shows properties similar to a regulatory
gene and can be mapped to a DNA locus by means of physi-
cal mapping just like a gene. The Genon Theory thus uses a
notion of “genetic” function that appears to be inconsistent
with the experimental evidence.
4 Structural Gene Definitions
Less than 15 years ago, the influential textbook Genes V
(Lewin, 1994) defined: “Gene (cistron) is the segment of
DNA involved in producing a polypeptide chain; it includes
regions preceding and following the coding region (leader
and trailer) as well as intervening sequences (introns) be-
tween individual coding segments (exons).” Older defini-
tions explicitly included promoters as part of the gene. Once
it had been realized, however, that the regulatory sequence
associated with gene expression can be widely dispersed,
many authors opted for viewing the “gene” as essentially
synonymous to “protein-coding transcript” (Snyder and Ger-
stein, 2003).
With the availability of large amounts of “omics” data,
many authors have advocated various versions of structural
definitions of the gene that amount to collections of tran-
scripts, see e.g. (Snyder and Gerstein, 2003; Gerstein et al.,
2007). The same approach is taken by current genome data-
bases: within the ensemble1 framework, a gene is defined
1 www.ensembl.org
as a set of (primary) transcripts. It seems that the gene def-
inition of Scherrer & Jost was also influenced by this trend:
even though introduced as a functional notion, a series of
simplifying assumptions reduce it to another easily identifi-
able genomic structure: the Open Reading Frame.
A purely structural definition of a gene in terms of a ge-
nomic “source”, however, does not seem useful to us. With-
out any reference to function, there is no way of singling
out a particular product of the regulatory cascade in general
or a specific processing stage of a transcript in particular.
As the end-product of every transcript is eventually a small
degradation fragment, and presumably a single nucleotide,
this approach does not lead to a meaningful definition. Al-
ternatively, one might view every processing stage as a dif-
ferent transcript and consequently as a different gene. This
would just rename “transcript” to “gene” and the set of all
genes would become equivalent to the transcriptome. An-
other approach is to define a gene as a collection of overlap-
ping transcripts. At least in eukaryotes, this leads to fairly
large regions equivalent to genomic/transcriptional domains
or, in the worst case, the whole genome, another trivial so-
lution. Between these two extremes, Gerstein et al. (2007)
consider genes as sets of overlapping transcripts that share
open reading frames. As we have argued above, singling out
particular processing stages or products is problematic since
such a definition can be applied only to a (possibly small)
subset of entities.
5 Genes Derived from Heritable Functional Units
We agree with Scherrer & Jost that a meaningful definition
of gene has to be based on a notion of function because
a purely structural gene definition is altogether dispensable
as we have seen above. In this section, we will briefly out-
line a research agenda that may eventually lead to a use-
ful function-based gene concept — or to the realization that
such an endeavor cannot succeed.
First, we reject the idea of a one-to-one correspondence
of function and “gene-product”, which seems much more a
vestige of the history of the gene concept than a property of a
biological system. The appeal of the equivalence of function
and product is that it makes function “measurable” by virtue
of detecting the product. We have argued above, however,
that the existence of a product does not imply that it has any
function at all, and conversely, the same product may have
multiple and mechanistically diverse biochemical functions,
depending on its context.
Hence, we expand the notion of function and postulate
that function must be measurable directly by some experi-
mental setup in finite time, and that one must be able to do
this in such a way that functional equivalence can be deter-
mined. What constitutes a function, and whether two func-
tions are distinguishable from each other, therefore depends
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on an experimental (or computational) procedure, which we
will for short call a “measurement” in the following. Differ-
ent procedures may represent “biological importance” more
or less well. Time-honored procedures such as the classical
complementation test of molecular genetics or the observa-
tion of the developmental effects of gene knock-outs are pro-
cedures that have proven useful. The approach of the Genon
Theory, namely to determine whether a stretch of DNA is
eventually translated into a polypeptide is yet another possi-
ble way to measure. We view computational approaches as
yet another procedure to assess information about function.
Of course, as with any “functional test”, all these procedures
come with inherent limitations and the possibility of false
positive and negative results. Such results may eventually
lead to erroneous conclusions about particular “genes”. This
is, however, also true for seemingly straightforward proce-
dures such as the assignment of ORFs (Brent, 2005), and
does not affect the conceptual framework.
Entire cells, organs, and organisms certainly convey func-
tion. Thus we would not want to be forced to call everything
that has a measurable function a “gene”. Just as Scherrer &
Jost do, we consider a gene a unit of function. The nature
of units, modules and their mutual relationships is a field
of lively debate in theoretical biology, see e.g. (Kvasnicka
and Pospı´chal, 2002; Tanaka et al., 2006; Schlosser, 2002;
Wagner et al., 2007), which we will not enter here. Instead,
we use the term “unit” in a broad sense: A unit should show
stronger cohesion to itself than to other components, thereby
ensuring its integrity in isolation. Consequently, a unit of
function should execute its function in isolation2, thereby
representing a “building block” or “basis element” of the
space of functions3. Novel functions may emerge from col-
lections of functional sub-units. Within a given experimental
protocol we may be able to distinguish the function of higher
level units from those of their components, thus functional
units can be nested within each other. Intuitively, we would
like to correlate the gene with the elementary functional
unit, i.e., a unit that cannot be understood as a collection
of functional units together with the emergent function(s)
arising from their combination. Whereas single molecules
and/or molecular complexes and their interactions play the
central role in molecular biology, researchers in other bio-
logical disciplines might be more interested in higher order
functional units. Such a coarse-grained level of functional-
ity could be represented by chemical reactions, interaction
networks, or phenotypic traits rather than products as func-
tional units. We suggest that each of these is a valid starting
point for a gene definition.
2 Units, whose function(s) rely on input and/or communication of
course need to be provided with this stimulus.
3
“Space” is used here in the formal mathematical sense as “a set
endowed with a certain abstract structure.”
In contrast to the Genon Theory, we postulate that genes
are heritable and therefore need to be part of the inherited
material. In 1952, Hershey and Chase found that the “in-
structions” for functional units are made of genetic mate-
rial, nucleic acid in general, DNA if present. However, ex-
ceptions to this rule are well known, e.g., epigenes, protein-
based inheritance (i.e. centriols and prions) and RNA-based
inheritance (Lolle et al., 2005) do instruct heritable func-
tional units. Heritability is determined by the process of in-
heritance, a sequence of reproduction and segregation. We
may or may not want to restrict the concept of genes to enti-
ties that are inherited in a particular way, namely by means
of the genetic material that comprises the genome.
A formal mathematical investigation of this schema should
eventually be able to relate elementary functional units to
their source in the inherited material. If a function-based
gene concept is feasible at all, such a mapping is the in-
dispensable pre-requisite for genes to become a useful no-
tion for molecular biology. We suspect that such a mapping
is not necessarily possible for all underlying definitions of
“function”, “unit” and/or their combinations. It is even con-
ceivable that such a mapping can never be constructed, in
which case we will have to abandon the notion of “func-
tional genes”. Even if we can construct the map, there is no
guarantee that the genomic source 4 corresponding to a par-
ticular definition of functional unit will show properties that
we would expect or desire from a gene. In particular, the
genomic representation of our functionally defined genes
may well be frustratingly complex and disparate from the
physical entities that we deal with in the various flavors of
“omics”.
In line with our arguments above we suggest that an ap-
propriate definition of a functional unit should not make
explicit reference to a particular class of molecules. While
determining the chemical composition is within the scope
of acceptable experimental protocols, a consequence of this
type of protocol is the disparate classification of molecules
with similar or identical functions, e.g. a protein enzyme vs.
a ribozyme that catalyzes the same chemical reaction. It is
at least conceivable that the chemical implementation of a
catalyst or regulator is irrelevant for a cell. Consequently,
functional units may just as well be of DNA nature. Op-
erators and other cis-regulatory elements behave much like
regulatory genes when assayed with many procedures typ-
ically used in genetics. In such a context, we may well be
obliged to treat them as functional units and consequently
as genes. On the other hand, Developmentally Regulated
DNA Rearrangements (DRDR) are not uncommon as mech-
anisms of expression regulation throughout eukaryotes (Zu-
fall et al., 2005). Ciliate genome processing (which inter-
estingly is regulated by small RNAs (Garnier et al., 2004)),
4 For simplicity of language we speak of the “genomic source” in-
stead of the more general “encoding in the inheritable material”.
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chromatin diminution (i.e., the selective elimination of por-
tions of chromosomes), the vertebrate immune system, and
the amplification of rDNA genes are the most prominent ex-
amples. DRDR is also involved in mating type switching
in yeast and prokaryotic differentiation, see e.g. (Carrasco
et al., 1995). Hence processes operating on the genomic ma-
terial have to be included in the processing program.
The boundaries of our genes as Heritable Elementary
Functional Units are eventually determined by the underly-
ing notion of function. Depending on this choice, genes may
or may not contain the information necessary to orchestrate
the production of the corresponding functional units from
the heritable material.
6 Concluding Remarks
In our discussion, we started from assumptions similar to
but less restrictive than those of the Genon Theory. We have
arrived at the definition of a gene as the pre-image of el-
ementary functional units on the heritable material. Aban-
doning the identification of function with a functional prod-
uct, we highlight the logical separation between functions
(measured by some experimental protocol) and expression
products. Expression of products, as described in Section 2,
is understood as computation-like processing cascade that
starts with the generation of a working copy of the inherita-
ble genetic information. The understanding of the mechan-
ics of expression (or the corresponding computation) does
not require the notion of a gene at all. It is sufficient to con-
sider the processing products and their molecular interac-
tions. Indeed, a sufficiently detailed model of the expression
processes is likely to be a good starting point to define func-
tion, functional units, and eventually genes.
The precise meaning of the term “gene expression” re-
mains elusive. Logically, it refers to the construction of func-
tional units from their heritable source. Since genes are not
synonymous with “products in the expression cascade”, gene
expression is not synonymous with the processing of indi-
vidual transcripts (or other individual processing products).
Instead, it must be understood as a composite of the ex-
pression program governing the construction of the molec-
ular components of the functional unit, together with addi-
tional interactions that are not encapsulated in any expressed
molecular product. A simple one-to-one relation between
the chemical and logical expression programs exists only in
limiting cases, for instance when functional units are identi-
fied with polypeptides as in the Genon Theory. In general, it
remains to be seen to what extent (logical) gene expression
can be modeled in a computational framework analogous
to the physical expression of products (in the sense of sec-
tion 2). Even if gene expression can be modeled in this way,
it is not clear a priori how the relations between the physical
and the logical expression program can be described.
A simple, but practically relevant implication of the dis-
tinction between expressed products and functionally de-
fined genes as advocated here, is that (at least at present)
genes are irrelevant for genome annotation. This statement
might be perceived as provocative. Nonetheless, we think
there are good arguments to take such a radical step. Genome
annotation, after all, is a pragmatic enterprise and hence has
to concentrate on information that is readily available or can
be generated with reasonable efforts. Therefore it is at least
largely limited to the physical objects of the expression cas-
cade and information such as binding sites. This informa-
tion is about biochemical processes at best and is indepen-
dent of the higher-level biological interpretation. Given the
organization of the transcriptome as a complex structure of
overlapping products in both reading directions (The EN-
CODE Project Consortium, 2007; Kapranov et al., 2007),
it makes little sense to tie a functional interpretation or a
disease relevance directly to a DNA position once the func-
tional product involved has been identified. There are, in-
deed, an increasing number of examples where the same
DNA locus gives rise to different products with different
functions (Ikeda et al., 2007; Bender, 2008). Of course, if
the information arose from a mutation or association study,
we can only map it to a DNA region, since we do not know
the responsible “gene” or expression product.
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